Returning to our example of the paper mill and the steel
mill, let us suppose that despite the advice of its economists the EPA
adopts the regulation and requires each
factory to reduce its pollution to 300 tons of glop per year. Then one day
after the regulation is in place and both mills have complied the two firms go
to the EPA with a proposal. The steel mill wants to increase its emission of
glop by 100 tons. The paper mill has agreed to reduce its emission by the same
amount if the steel mill pays it $5 million. Should the EPA allow the two
factories to make this deal.
From the standpoint of economic efficiency allowing the deal
is good policy. The deal must make the owners of the two factories better off
because they are voluntarily agreeing to it. Moreover the deal does not have
any external effect because the total amount of pollution remains the same.
Thus social welfare is enhanced by allowing the paper mill to sell its right to
pollute to the steel mill.
The same logic applies to any voluntary transfer of the
right to pollute from one firm to another if the EPA allows firms to make these
deals it will in essence have created a
new scarce resource pollution permits.
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